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An Unknown Input Multi-Observer Approach for Estimation, Attack
Isolation, and Control of LTI Systems under Actuator Attacks
Tianci Yang, Carlos Murguia, Margreta Kuijper, and Dragan Nesˇic´
Abstract—We address the problem of state estimation, attack
isolation, and control for discrete-time Linear Time Invariant
(LTI) systems under (potentially unbounded) actuator false data
injection attacks. Using a bank of Unknown Input Observers
(UIOs), each observer leading to an exponentially stable esti-
mation error in the attack-free case, we propose an estimator
that provides exponential estimates of the system state and the
attack signals when a sufficiently small number of actuators
are attacked. We use these estimates to control the system and
isolate actuator attacks. Simulations results are presented to
illustrate the performance of the results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networked Control Systems (NCSs) have emerged as
a technology that combines control, communication, and
computation and offers the necessary flexibility to meet new
demands in distributed and large scale systems. Recently,
security of NCSs has become an important issue as wireless
communication networks might serve as new access points
for attackers to adversely affect the operation of the system
dynamics. Cyber-physical attacks on NCSs have caused sub-
stantial damage to a number of physical processes. One of the
most well-known examples is the attack on Maroochy Shire
Councils sewage control system in Queensland, Australia
that happened in January 2000. The attacker hacked into
the controllers that activate and deactivate valves and caused
flooding of the grounds of a hotel, a park, and a river with a
million liters of sewage. Another incident is the more recent
StuxNet virus that targeted Siemens supervisory control and
data acquisition systems which are used in many industrial
processes. It follows that strategic mechanisms to identify
and deal with attacks on NCSs are strongly needed.
In [1]-[23], a range of topics related to security of linear
control systems have been discussed. In general, they provide
analysis tools for quantifying the performance degradation
induced by different classes of attacks; and propose reaction
strategies to identify and counter their effect on the sys-
tem dynamics. There are also some results addressing the
nonlinear case. In [24], exploiting sensor redundancy, the
authors address the problem of sensor attack detection and
state estimation for uniformly observable continuous-time
nonlinear systems. Similarly, in [25], the authors provide an
algorithm for isolating sensor attacks for a class of discrete-
time nonlinear systems with bounded measurement noise.
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In this manuscript, we use Unknown Input Observers
(UIOs) to address the problem of state estimation, attack
isolation, and control for discrete-time Linear Time Invari-
ant (LTI) systems under (potentially unbounded) actuator
attacks. Unknown input observers are dynamical systems
capable of estimating the state of the plant without using
input signals. If such an observer exists and some of the
inputs are subject to attacks, we can reconstruct the system
state without using inputs; and use these estimates to recon-
struct the attack signals by using model matching techniques.
The existence of UIOs depend on the system dynamics,
i.e., the matrices (A,B,C) comprising the system. If an
UIO does not exists for this complete (A,B,C) but it does
for some partial (A, B˜i, C), where B˜i denotes a submatrix
of B with fewer columns and the same number of rows,
then, using a bank of observers, we can use similar ideas to
perform state estimation and attack isolation at the price of
only being able to isolate when a sufficiently small subset
of actuators are under attack. The main idea behind our
multi-observer estimator is the following. Each UIO in the
bank is constructed using a triple (A, B˜i, C), i.e., the i-th
observer does not use the input signals associated with B˜i,
but it does use the remaining input signals. If the inputs
corresponding to B˜i include all the attacked ones, this UIO
produces an exponentially stable estimation error. For every
pair of UIOs in the bank, we compute the largest difference
between their estimates. Then, we select the pair leading
to the smallest difference and prove that these observers
reconstruct the state of the system exponentially. This idea is
guaranteed to work under the assumption that less than half
of the actuators are attacked. This multi-observer approach
is inspired by the results given in [26] where the problem
of state estimation for continuous-time LTI systems under
sensor attacks is considered. Once we have an estimate
of the state, we reconstruct the attack signals using model
matching techniques. Finally, we propose a simple yet ef-
fective technique to stabilize the system by switching off the
isolated actuators, and closing the loop with a multi-observer
based output dynamic feedback controller. Here, we assume
that the set of attacked actuators is time-invariant, i.e., if
the opponent compromises a set of actuators at some time-
instant, only this set will be compromised in forward time.
Because attack signals may be zero for some time instants,
the actuators isolated as attack-free might arbitrarily switch
among all the supersets of the set of attack-free actuators.
Therefore, we need a controller able to stabilize the closed-
loop dynamics under the arbitrary switching induced by
turning off the isolated actuators. To achieve this, we assume
that a state feedback controller that stabilizes the switching
closed-loop system exists, and use this controller together
with the multi-observer estimator to stabilize the system.
We use Input-to-State Stability (ISS) [27] of the closed-loop
system with respect to the exponentially stable estimation
error to conclude on stability of the closed-loop dynamics.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
present some preliminary results needed for the subsequent
sections. In Section III, we introduce the proposed UIO-
based estimation schemes. In Section IV, a method for
isolating actuator attacks is described. The proposed control
scheme is given in Section V. Finally, in Section VI, we give
concluding remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
We denote the set of real numbers by R, the set of natural
numbers by N , the set of integers by Z, and the set of n×m
real matrices by Rn×m, m,n ∈ N. For any vector v ∈ Rnv ,
vJ denotes the stacking of all vi, i ∈ J and J ⊂ {1, . . . , nv},
|v| =
√
v⊤v and supp(v) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , nv} |vi 6= 0}. For
a sequence of vectors {v(k)}∞k=0, we denote by v[0,k] the se-
quence of vectors v(i), i = 0, . . . , k, ||v||∞ := supk≥0 |v(k)|
and ||v||T := sup0≤k≤T |v(k)|. We say that a sequence
{v(k)} ∈ l∞, if ||v||∞ < ∞. We denote the cardinality
of a set S as card(S). The binomial coefficient is denoted
as
(
a
b
)
, where a, b are nonnegative integers. We denote a
variable m uniformly distributed in the interval (z1, z2) as
m ∼ U(z1, z2) and normally distributed with mean µ and
variance σ2 as m ∼ N (µ, σ2). The notation 0n and In
denote the zero matrix and the identity matrix of dimension
R
n×n, respectively. We simply write 0 and I when their
dimensions are evident.
III. UNKNOWN INPUT OBSERVER-BASED ESTIMATOR
Consider the discrete-time LTI system:{
x+ =Ax+B(u + a),
y =Cx,
(1)
with state x ∈ Rn, output y ∈ Rny , known input u ∈ Rp, and
vector of actuator attacks a ∈ Rp, a = (a1, . . . , ap)T . That
is, ai(k) = 0 for all k ≥ 0 if the i-th actuator is attack-free;
otherwise, ai(k) 6= 0 for some (but not necessarily all) time
instants k ≥ 0, and can be arbitrarily large. Matrices A,B,C
are of appropriate dimensions, (A,B) is stabilizable, (A,C)
is detectable, and B has full column rank. Let the set of
unknown attacked actuators be denoted by W ⊂ {1, . . . , p},
i.e., ai(ki) 6= 0 for some ki ≥ 0 and all i ∈ W .
Assumption 1 The set of attacked actuators is time invari-
ant, i.e., W ⊂ {1, . . . , p} is a constant set.
A. Complete Unknown Input Observers
We first treat (u + a) as an unknown input to system (1)
and consider an UIO with the following structure:{
z+ =Nz + Ly,
xˆ =z + Ey,
(2)
where z ∈ Rn is the state of the observer, xˆ ∈ Rn denotes
the estimate of the system state, and (N,L,E) are observer
matrices of appropriate dimensions to be designed. It is easy
to verify that if (N,L,E) satisfy the following equations:{
N(I − EC) + LC + (EC − I)A =0,
(EC − I)B =0, (3)
then, the estimation error e := xˆ− x satisfies the difference
equation:
e+ = Ne. (4)
Hence, if N is Schur, system (2) is an UIO for (1). In [28],
it is proved that such an observer exists if and only if the
following two conditions are satisfied:
(c1) rank(CB) = rank(B) = p.
(c2)Matrix E in (2) yields the pair (A−ECA,C) detectable.
Assume that conditions (c1) and (c2) are satisfied; then,
observer (2) can be constructed by solving (3) for a Schur
matrix N . Hence, for such an observer, there exist c > 0 and
λ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying:
|xˆ(k)− x(k)| ≤ cλk|xˆ(0)− x(0)|, (5)
for k ≥ 0, i.e., observer (2) reconstructs the system state
without using any input for arbitrarily large attack signals a.
Example 1: Consider the following system:

x+ =
[
0.2 0.5
0.2 0.7
]
x+
[
1
2
]
(u+ a),
y =

1 31 1
3 2

x. (6)
An UIO exists for system (6). We let W = {1},
a ∈ U(−1, 1), u ∈ U(−1, 1), and the initial conditions
x1(0), x2(0) ∈ N (0, 1). We solve (3) for some Schur matrix
N and construct an unknown input observer for (6). The
performance of the estimator is shown in Figure 1 for
xˆ(0) = [0, 0]
⊤
.
B. Partial Unknown Input Observers
In [26], the problem of state estimation for continuous-
time LTI system under sensor attacks is solved using a
bank of Luenberger observers. Inspired by these results, we
use a bank of partial UIOs to estimate the state of the
system when actuator attacks occur. Here, we are implicitly
assuming that either condition (c1) or (c2) (or both) cannot
be satisfied by the triple (A,B,C). Let B be partitioned as
B = [b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bp] where bi ∈ Rn×1 is the i-th column
of B. Then, the attacked system (1) can be written as{
x+ =Ax+Bu+ bWaW ,
y =Cx,
(7)
where the attack input aW can be regarded as an unknown
input and the columns of bW are bi for i ∈ W . Denote
by bJ the matrix whose columns are bi for i ∈ J . Let q
be the largest integer such that for all J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with
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Fig. 1. Estimated states xˆ converges to the true states x when a ∼
U(−1, 1). Legend: xˆ (grey), true states (black)
card(J) ≤ 2q, the following is satisfied:
(c3) rank(CbJ ) = rank(bJ) = card(J).
(c4) There exist (NJ , LJ , EJ , TJ) satisfying the equations:

NJ(I − EJC) + LJC + (EJC − I)A =0,
(TJ + EJC − I)B =0,
(EJC − I)bJ =0,
(8)
with detectable pair (C,A − EJCA), and Schur NJ .
Then, if conditions (c3) and (c4) are satisfied, an UIO with
the following structure:{
z+J =NJzJ + TJBu+ LJy,
xˆJ =zJ + EJy,
(9)
exists for each bJ , J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) ≤ 2q < p,
where zJ ∈ Rn is the observer state, xˆJ ∈ Rn denotes
the state estimate, and (NJ , LJ , TJ , EJ ) are the observer
matrices satisfying (8), see [28] for further details. That is,
system (9) is an UIO observer for the system:{
x+ =Ax+Bu+ bJaJ ,
y =Cx,
(10)
with unknown input bJaJ and known input Bu. It follows
that the estimation error eJ = xˆJ −x satisfies the difference
equation:
e+J = NJeJ , (11)
with NJ schur.
Assumption 2 There are at most q attacked actuators, i.e.,
card(W ) ≤ q < p
2
, (12)
where q > 0 is the largest integer satisfying (c3) and (c4).
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 2, among all possible sets of q
actuators, at least one set includes all the attacked actuators.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 2, for each set of q actuators,
among all its supersets of 2q actuators, at least one superset
includes all the attacked actuators.
Proof: Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 follow trivially from the fact
that 0 < q < p/2. 
Note that the existence of an UIO for each bJ with
card(J) ≤ 2q implies that if W ⊆ J , the estimation error
eJ := xˆJ − x satisfies
|eJ | ≤ cJλkJ |eJ(0)|, (13)
for some cJ > 0, λJ ∈ (0, 1), all eJ(0) ∈ Rn and all k ≥ 0.
Let Assumption 2 be satisfied. We construct an UIO for each
J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = q and each set S with
card(S) = 2q. Then, by Lemma 1, there exists at least one
set J¯ ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J¯) = q such that W ⊆ J¯
and the estimate produced by the UIO for J¯ is a correct
state estimate. Thus, the estimates given by any S ⊃ J¯ with
card(S) = 2q will be consistent with that given by J¯ . This
motivates the following estimation strategy:
For each set J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = q and all k ≥ 0,
we define piJ(k) as the largest deviation between xˆJ (k) and
xˆS(k) that is given by any set S ⊃ J with card(S) = 2q:
piJ(k) := max
S⊃J:card(S)=2q
|xˆJ (k)− xˆS(k)|, (14)
for all k ≥ 0, and define the sequence σ(k) as
σ(k) := argmin
J⊂{1,...,p}:card(J)=q
piJ(k). (15)
The estimate given by the set σ(k) is a correct estimate, i.e.,
xˆ(k) := xˆσ(k)(k), (16)
where xˆσ(k)(k) denotes the estimate given by the set σ(k),
provides an exponential estimate of the system state. For
simplicity and without generality, for all J and S, zJ(0) and
zS(0) are chosen such that xˆJ (0) = xˆS(0) = xˆ(0). The
following result summarizes the ideas presented above.
Theorem 1 Consider system (1). Let conditions (c3) and
(c4), and Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 be satisfied, and
consider the multi-observer (14)-(16). Define the estimation
error e(k) := xˆσ(k)(k) − x(k); then, there exist constants
c¯ > 0 and λ¯ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying:
|e(k)| ≤ c¯λ¯k|e(0)|, (17)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn, k ≥ 0.
Proof: By Lemma 1, there exists at least one set J¯ with
card(J¯) = q such that J¯ ⊃ W . By (c3) and (c4), for J =
J¯ ⊃ W with card(J¯) = q, there exist cJ¯ > 0 and λJ¯ ∈
(0, 1), such that
|eJ¯(k)| ≤ cJ¯λkJ¯ |e(0)|, (18)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0. Moreover, for any set S ⊃ J¯
with card(S) = 2q, we have S ⊃W ∀k ≥ 0; hence, by (c3)
and (c4), there exist cS > 0 and λS ∈ (0, 1) such that
|eS(k)| ≤ cSλkS |e(0)|, (19)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0. Consider piJ¯ in (14). Combining
the above results, we have that
piJ¯(k) =max
S⊃J¯
|xˆJ¯ (k)− xˆS(k)|
=max
S⊃J¯
|xˆJ¯ (k)− x(k) + x(k)− xˆS(k)|
≤|eJ¯(k)|+max
S⊃J¯
|eS(k)|,
(20)
for all k ≥ 0. From (18) and (19), we obtain
piJ¯ (k) ≤ 2c′J¯λ
′k
J¯
|e(0)|, (21)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0, where
c′
J¯
:= max
S⊃J¯
{cJ¯ , cS} , λ′J¯ := max
S⊃J¯
{λJ¯ , λS} .
Note that S ⊃ J¯ with card(S) = 2q, thus, from (15), we
have piσ(k)(k) ≤ piJ¯ (k). From Lemma 2, we know that there
exists at least one set S¯ ⊃ σ(k) with card(S¯) = 2q such that
S¯ ⊃ W ∀k ≥ 0, and, by (c3) and (c4), there exist cS¯ > 0
and λS¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that
|eS¯(k)| ≤ cS¯λkS¯ |e(0)|, (22)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0. From (14), by construction
piσ(k)(k) = max
S⊃σ(k):card(S)=2q
|xˆσ(k)(k)− xˆS(k)|
≥|xˆσ(k)(k)− xˆS¯(k)|,
using the above lower bound on piσ(k)(k) and the triangle
inequality, we have that
|eσ(k)(k)| =|xˆσ(k)(k)− x(k)|
=|xˆσ(k)(k)− xˆS¯(k) + xˆS¯(k)− x(k)|
≤|xˆσ(k)(k)− xˆS¯(k)|+ |eS¯(k)|
≤piσ(k)(k) + |eS¯(k)|
≤piJ¯ (k) + |eS¯(k)|,
(23)
for all k ≥ 0. Hence, from (21) and (22), we have
|eσ(k)(k)| ≤ c¯λ¯k|e(0)|, (24)
for all e(0) ∈ Rn and k ≥ 0, where c¯ = 3max{cS¯ , c′J¯} and
λ¯ = max
{
λS¯ , λ
′
J¯
}
. Inequality (24) is of the form (17), and
the result follows. 
Example 2 Consider the following system:

x+ =

0.5 0 0.10.2 0.7 0
1 0 0.3

x+

1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1

 (u+ a),
y =
[
1 2 0
2 1 3
]
x.
(25)
It can be verified that a complete UIO for (25) does not exist.
However, partial UIOs exist for each bJ with card(J) ≤ 2;
then, 2q = 2, i.e., q = 1. We let W = {2}, i.e., the second
actuator is attacked. We let u1, u2, u3 ∈ U(−1, 1), a2 ∈
U(−1, 1), and x1(0), x2(0), x3(0) ∈ N (0, 1). We construct
an UIO for each set J ⊂ {1, 2, 3} with card(J) = 1 and each
S ⊂ {1, 2, 3} with card(S) = 2. Totally (31)+ (32) = 6 UIOs
are designed and they are all initialized at xˆ(0) = [0, 0, 0]⊤.
The performance of the estimator is shown in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Estimated states xˆ converges to the true states x when a2 ∼
U(−1, 1). Legend: xˆ (grey), true states (black)
IV. ISOLATION OF ACTUATOR ATTACKS
Once we have an estimate xˆ(k) of x(k), either using
the complete observer in Section III-A or the partial multi-
observer estimator in Section III-B, we can use these es-
timates, the system model (1), and the known inputs to
exponentially reconstruct the attack signals. First, consider
the complete observer in Section III-A. By construction, the
estimation error e = xˆ − x satisfies the difference equation
(4) for some Schur matrix N . Note that e = xˆ − x ⇒ x =
xˆ− e⇒ x+ = xˆ+− e+. Then, the system dynamics (1) can
be written in terms of e and xˆ as follows:

xˆ+ = e+ +A(xˆ − e) +B(u + a),
⇓
a = B−1left(xˆ
+ −Axˆ)− u+B−1left(e+ −Ae),
(26)
because B has full column rank, where B−1left denotes the
Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of B. Therefore, because e
(and thus e+ as well) vanishes exponentially, the following
attack estimate:
aˆ(k) = B−1left(xˆ(k)−Axˆ(k − 1))− u(k − 1), (27)
exponentially reconstructs the attack signals a(k − 1), i.e.,
lim
k→∞
(aˆ(k)− a(k − 1)) = 0. (28)
Then, for sufficiently large k, we assume supp(a(k)) =
supp(a(k − 1)), thus, the sparsity pattern of aˆ(k) can be
used to isolate actuator attacks at time k, i.e.,
Wˆ (k) = supp(aˆ(k)), (29)
where Wˆ (k) denotes the set of isolated actuators at time k.
Note that we can only estimate a from xˆ+ and e+, which
implies that we always have, at least, one-step delay.
Next, consider the partial multi-observer estimator given
in Section III-B. In this case, the attack vector a can also
be written as (26) but the estimation error dynamics is now
given by some nonlinear difference equation characterized
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Fig. 3. Estimated attack aˆ converges to a when a ∼ U(−1, 1). Legend:
aˆ (grey), a (black)
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Fig. 4. Estimated states aˆ converges to a when a2 ∼ U(−1, 1). Legend:
aˆ (grey), a (black)
by the estimator structure in (14)-(16). Let the estimation
error dynamics be given by
e+ = f(e, x, a), (30)
for some nonlinear function f : Rn × Rn ×Rp → Rn. That
is, the estimation error is given by some nonlinear function
of the state and the attack signals. However, in Theorem 1,
we have proved that e converges to the origin exponentially.
Hence, the terms depending on e and e+ in the expression
for a in (26) vanishes exponentially and therefore the attack
estimate in (27) exponentially reconstructs the attack signals.
Again, the sparsity pattern of aˆ(k) can be used to isolate
actuator attacks using (29).
Example 3 Consider system (6) and the complete UIO in
Example 1. Let W = {1}, a ∈ U(−1, 1), u ∈ U(−1, 1), and
x1(0), x2(0) ∈ N (0, 1). For k ∈ [800, 1000], we obtain the
attack estimates aˆ(k) using (27). The performance is shown
in Figure 3.
Example 4 Consider system (25) and the multi-observer
estimator in Example 2. Let q∗ = 1, W = {2}, u1, u2, u3 ∈
U(−1, 1), a2 ∈ U(−1, 1), and x1(0), x2(0), x3(0) ∈
N (0, 12). For k ∈ [800, 1000], we obtain xˆ(k) using (14)-
(16) and the vector aˆ(k) from (27). The performance is
shown in Figure 4. Note that Wˆ (k) = {2}, i.e., the second
actuator is correctly isolated.
V. CONTROL
In this section, we propose a simple yet effective technique
to stabilize the system by switching off the isolated actuators,
i.e., by removing the columns of B which correspond to the
isolated actuators, and closing the loop with a multi-observer
(observer) based output dynamic feedback controller. Indeed,
we need the system to be stabilizable after switching off
the isolated actuators. We first consider the case when a
complete UIO exists (Section III-A), i.e., xˆ is generated by
(2). We estimate aˆ(k) using (27) and obtain Wˆ (k) from
(29). Again, let B be partitioned as B = [b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bp].
Define J¯(k) := {1, . . . , p} \ Wˆ (k) and bJ¯(k) as the matrix
whose columns are bi for i ∈ J¯(k), i.e., J¯(k) ⊂ {1, . . . , p}
is the set of isolated attack-free actuators and the columns of
bJ¯(k) are the corresponding columns of B. Therefore, after
switching off the set Wˆ (k) of actuators, the system has the
following form:
x+ = Ax+ bJ¯(k)u¯ (31)
where u¯ ∈ Rcard(J¯(k)) is the set of isolated attack-free inputs.
Let q⋆ be the largest integer such that (A, bJ ) is stabilizable
for each set J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) ≥ p − q⋆ where
bJ denotes a matrix whose columns are bi for i ∈ J . We
assume that at most q⋆ actuators are attacked. It follows that
p− q⋆ ≤ card(J¯(k)) ≤ p. We assume the following.
Assumption 3 For any subset J with cardinality card(J) =
p − q⋆, there exists a linear switching state feedback con-
troller u¯ = KJ¯(k)x such that the closed-loop dynamics:
x+ = (A+ bJ¯(k)KJ¯(k))x, (32)
is GAS for bJ¯(k) arbitrarily switching among all bJ′ with
J ⊂ J ′ ⊂ {1, . . . , p} and p− q⋆ ≤ card(J ′) ≤ p.
Remark 1 We do not give a method for designing the linear
switching state feedback controller u¯ = KJ¯(k)x. We refer
the interested reader to, e.g., [29] and references therein, for
design methods of linear switching controllers.
By switching off the set Wˆ (k) of actuators at time k, using
the controller designed for the set J¯(k), and letting u¯ =
KJ¯(k)xˆ, the closed-loop system can be written as
x+ = (A+ bJ¯(k)KJ¯(k))x+ bJ¯(k)KJ¯(k)e, (33)
with estimation error e = xˆ − x satisfying the difference
equation (4) for some Schur matrix N . Because e(k) con-
verges to zero exponentially, e(k) in (33) is a vanishing
perturbation. Hence, under Assumption 3, it follows that
limk→∞ x(k) = 0.
Next, assume that a complete UIO does not exist but
partial UIOs exist for each bJ with card(J) ≤ 2q < p
(Section III-B) and q ≤ q⋆. We assume that at most q
actuators are attacked. We construct xˆ(k) from (14)-(16),
estimate aˆ(k) using (27), and obtain Wˆ (k) from (29). After
switching off the set Wˆ (k) of actuators, the system has the
form (31) with p − q ≤ card(J¯(k)) ≤ p. We assume the
following.
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Fig. 5. State trajectories when a1 ∼ U(−1, 1).
Assumption 4 For any subset J with cardinality card(J) =
p−q, there exists a linear switching state feedback controller
u¯ = KJ¯(k)x such that the closed-loop dynamics:
x+ = (A+ bJ¯(k)KJ¯(k))x, (34)
is GAS for bJ¯(k) arbitrarily switching among all bJ′ with
J ⊂ J ′ ⊂ {1, . . . , p} and p− q ≤ card(J ′) ≤ p.
Then, by switching off the set Wˆ (k) of actuators at time k,
using the controller designed for the set J¯(k), and letting u¯ =
KJ¯(k)xˆ, the closed-loop dynamics can be written in the form
(33). Then, in this case, e(k) is generated by some nonlinear
difference equation of the form (30). Under Assumption 4,
the closed-loop dynamics (33) is Input-to-State Stable (ISS)
with input e(k) and some linear gain, see [30]. Moreover, in
Theorem 1, we have proved that e(k) converges to the origin
exponentially uniformly in x(k) and a(k). The latter and ISS
of the system dynamics imply that limk→∞ x(k) = 0 [31].
Example 5 Consider the following system:

x+ =

1.5 0 0.10.2 0.7 0
1 0 0.3

x+

1 1 10 1 0
0 0 1

 (u+ a),
y =
[
1 2 0
2 1 3
]
x,
(35)
with u = KJ¯(k)xˆ. Since (A, bi) is stabilizable for i ∈
{1, 2, 3}, we have q⋆ = 2. It can be verified that there
does not exist a complete UIO for this system but partial
UIOs exist for each bJ with card(J) ≤ 2, then we have
q = 1. We let W = {1}, and a1 ∈ U(−1, 1). We
construct
(
3
1
)
+
(
3
2
)
= 6 UIOs and use the design method
given in [29] to build controllers for actuators {1, 2}, {1, 3},
{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}. Then, we use the multi-observer approach
in Section III-B to estimate the state, reconstruct the attack
signals, and control the system. The state of the system is
shown in Figure 5.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have addressed the problem of state estimation, attack
isolation, and control for discrete-time LTI systems under
(potentially unbounded) actuator false data injection attacks.
Using a bank of Unknown Input Observers (UIOs), we
have proposed an estimator that reconstructs the system
state and the attack signals. We have proved that the de-
signed estimator provides exponentially stable estimation
errors for potentially unbounded attack signals. We used
these estimates to control the system and isolate actuator
attacks. We have provided simulations results to illustrate
the performance of the results.
REFERENCES
[1] H. Fawzi, P. Tabuada, and S. Diggavi, “Security for control systems
under sensor and actuator attacks,” in IEEE 51st Conference on
Desision and Control (CDC ), 2012, pp. 3412–3417.
[2] M. Massoumnia, G. C. Verghese, and A. S. Willsky, “Failure detection
and identification in linear time-invariant systems,” Technology, no.
July, 1986.
[3] M. Pajic, J. Weimer, N. Bezzo, P. Tabuada, O. Sokolsky, I. Lee,
and G. J. Pappas, “Robustness of attack-resilient state estimators,”
2014 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems
(ICCPS), pp. 163–174, 2014.
[4] Y. Mo and B. Sinopoli, “Resilient detection in the presence of integrity
attacks,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 62, no. 1, pp.
31–43, 2014.
[5] K. G. Vamvoudakis, J. P. Hespanha, B. Sinopoli, and Y. Mo, “De-
tection in adversarial environments,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, vol. 59, no. 12, pp. 3209–3223, 2015.
[6] M. S. Chong and M. Kuijper, “Characterising the vulnerability of
linear control systems under sensor attacks using a system’s security
index,” in IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC),
2016, pp. 5906–5911.
[7] K. G. Vamvoudakis, J. P. Hespanha, B. Sinopoli, and Y. Mo, “Ad-
versarial detection as a zero-sum game,” in IEEE 51st Conference on
Decision and Control (CDC), 2012, pp. 7133–7138.
[8] Y. Shoukry, P. Nuzzo, A. Puggelli, A. L. Sangiovanni-Vincentelli,
S. a. Seshia, and P. Tabuada, “Secure State Estimation For Cyber
Physical Systems Under Sensor Attacks: A Satisfiability Modulo
Theory Approach,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 62,
no. 10, pp. 4917 – 4932, 2017.
[9] S. Z. Yong, M. Zhu, and E. Frazzoli, “Resilient state estimation against
switching attacks on stochastic cyber-physical systems,” in IEEE 54th
Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2015, pp. 5162–5169.
[10] J. Park, J. Weimer, and I. Lee, “Sensor attack detection in the presence
of transient faults,” 6th International Conference on Cyber-Physical
Systems, no. April, pp. 1–10, 2015.
[11] Y. Liu, P. Ning, and M. K. Reiter, “False data injection attacks
against state estimation in electric power grids,” ACM Transactions
on Information and System Security, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 21–32, 2009.
[12] Z. Tang, K. Margreta, M. Chong, and I. Mareels, “Sensor attack
correction for linear systems with known inputs,” 7th IFAC Workshop
on Distributed Estimation and Control in Networked Systems, no. May,
2018.
[13] A. Teixeira, I. Shames, H. Sandberg, and K. H. Johansson, “Revealing
stealthy attacks in control systems,” 2012 50th Annual Allerton Con-
ference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2012,
pp. 1806–1813, 2012.
[14] C. Murguia and J. Ruths, “Characterization of a CUSUM model-based
sensor attack detector,” in 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision
and Control, CDC 2016, 2016, pp. 1303–1309.
[15] V. S. Dolk, P. Tesi, C. D. Persis, and W. P. M. H. Heemels,
“Event-triggered control systems under denial-of-service attacks,”
IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, vol. 4, pp. 93–
105, 2017.
[16] N. Hashemil, C. Murguia, and J. Ruths, “A comparison of stealthy
sensor attacks on control systems,” in proceedings of the American
Control Conference (ACC), 2017.
[17] F. Pasqualetti, F. Dorfler, and F. Bullo, “Attack detection and identi-
fication in cyber-physical systems,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, vol. 58, pp. 2715–2729, 2013.
[18] C. Murguia and J. Ruths, “On reachable sets of hidden cps sensor
attacks,” in proceedings of the American Control Conference (ACC),
2017.
[19] J. Giraldo, A. Cardenas, and N. Quijano, “Integrity attacks on real-
time pricing in smart grids: Impact and countermeasures,” IEEE
Transactions on Smart Grid, 2016.
[20] C. Murguia and J. Ruths, “Cusum and chi-squared attack detection of
compromised sensors,” in proceedings of the IEEE Multi-Conference
on Systems and Control (MSC), 2016.
[21] S. H. Kafash, J. Giraldo, C. Murguia, A. A. Cardenas, and J. Ruths,
“Constraining attacker capabilities through actuator saturation,” in
proceedings of the American Control Conference (ACC), 2017.
[22] C. Murguia, N. van de Wouw, and J. Ruths, “Reachable sets of hidden
cps sensor attacks: Analysis and synthesis tools,” in proceedings of the
IFAC World Congress, 2016.
[23] C. Murguia, I. Shames, F. Farokhi, and D. Nesˇic´, “On privacy of
quantized sensor measurements through additive noise,” in proceedings
of the 57th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2018.
[24] J. Kim, C. Lee, H. Shim, Y. Eun, and J. H. Seo, “Detection of sensor
attack and resilient state estimation for uniformly observable nonlinear
systems,” IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), pp.
1297–1302, 2016.
[25] T. Yang, C. Murguia, M. Kuijper, and D. Nesˇic´, “Attack detection and
isolation for discrete-time nonlinear systems,” in proceedings of the
Australian and New Zealand Control Conference (ANZCC), 2018.
[26] M. S. Chong, M. Wakaiki, and J. P. Hespanha, “Observability of
linear systems under adversarial attacks,” Proceedings of the American
Control Conference, vol. 2015-July, pp. 2439–2444, 2015.
[27] E. D. Sontag, “Input to state stability: Basic concepts and results,”
Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 1932, pp. 163–220, 2008.
[28] S. X. Ding, Model-based fault diagnosis techniques: Design schemes,
algorithms, and tools, 2008.
[29] J. Daafouz, P. Riedinger, and C. Iung, “Stability Analysis and Con-
trol Synthesis for Switched Systems: A switched Lyapunov function
approach,” IEEE Trans. on Automat. Contr., vol. 47, no. 11, pp. 1883–
1887, 2002.
[30] E. D. Sontag and Y. Wang, “Output-to-state stability and detectability
of nonlinear systems,” Systems & Control Letters, vol. 29, no. Septem-
ber, pp. 279–290, 1997.
[31] Z.-P. Jiang and Y. Wang, “Input-to-state stability for discrete-time
nonlinear systems,” Automatica, vol. 37, no. 6, pp. 857–869, 2001.
